Curious case of Pakistan’s geopolitical rehabilitation
Pakistan’s current regional strategy appears to be one of hedging, free-riding, and seeking to act as an intermediary among various regional factions
Pakistan had been sidelined by the West and the US after the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan in late 2021. It has re-emerged on the global geopolitical stage now, and is in a strategic sweet spot. Pakistan army chief Asim Munir recently made his third visit to Washington, along with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and met US President Donald Trump at the White House. Although the exact US-Pakistan plans for South Asia are unclear, Trump’s outreach to Pakistan has firmly repositioned Islamabad at the core of regional geopolitics. That Pakistan-US relations are deepening in the wake of an India-Pakistan military conflict — which also highlighted Pakistan’s dependence on China for defence — underscores the complex play behind Pakistan’s current geopolitical positioning.
The American rehabilitation of Pakistan appears to have triggered a series of regional developments. Islamabad is strengthening its relationship with China, re-engaging the US, cultivating Saudi Arabia, warming up to Russia, bringing Turkey into play, and managing Afghanistan and Iran.
Pakistan, like India, is also following a policy of multi-alignment even though it has a very different philosophy guiding this. India manages its relationships with major partners based on their own merits, while Pakistan’s multi-alignment primarily aims to use its partnerships to counter India. In other words, India is the focus behind Pakistan’s multi-alignment strategy whereas Pakistan plays a limited role in India’s policies of multi-alignment. True to its ability to exploit geopolitical uncertainty and chaos, Pakistan has positioned itself comfortably between two emerging poles that may soon be in competition with each other. These poles were engaged in a growing rivalry until Trump re-entered the scene earlier this year, shifting the focus away from the structural competition with China and the rivalry with Russia. Today, while India finds itself in a disadvantageous position due to Trump’s new approach to China and Russia, one of the States that has benefited most from the US repositioning is Pakistan. American hyphenation of India and Pakistan is an old story; Trump’s policies have a zero-sum effect in South Asia where India’s loss appears to be Pakistan’s gain.
Pakistan’s current regional strategy appears to be one of hedging, freeriding, and seeking to act as an intermediary among various regional factions. Some of this is the result of careful calculation, while the rest is driven by broader geopolitical circumstances.
In what may seem like a counter-intuitive strategy, Pakistan is hedging between contradictory poles, unwilling to join the bandwagon of any one side or take a clear stand. Despite being a close Chinese ally in the region, Pakistan shows little hesitation in engaging with its arch-rival, the US. On the other hand, its outreach to Washington also can’t be characterised as bandwagoning with the Americans. The US and Pakistan have both used each other in the past, and the current engagement appears to follow a similar pattern. In this sense, Pakistan today is not a classical bandwagoner; it prefers to avoid being tied to any one alliance and is willing to reach out to all powers positioned on either side of the geopolitical spectrum. By engaging with the US, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey — each a major power in their respective regions — Pakistan is hedging its bets, waiting for greater geopolitical clarity while keeping its cards close to its chest.
Its second broad strategy is to freeride on others’ efforts. Even as Pakistan refuses to fully bandwagon with the US, it is also freeriding on Trump’s current antipathy towards New Delhi and China’s desire to contain India’s rise in the region. It is also freeriding on broader Chinese and Russian strategies to rid the region of American/western influence without actively contributing to their efforts to pose a counter-pole to the US and its allies.
China and Russia are rapidly filling the vacuum created by the US’s strategic withdrawal from West Asia, exploiting the resultant chaos, as seen in the recent Iran-Russia nuclear deal. While Pakistan may not be closely aligned with Russia or Iran as a strategic ally of China in the region, it gets access to the China-led regional bloc that includes Russia and Iran even as it is growing closer to the US.
Pakistan also appears keen on playing a bridging role between various players of the region’s geopolitical competition. Each of the major powers active in the region, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey and US have one thing in common — their growing ties to Pakistan. While Pakistan may not be in a position to ameliorate their mutual differences, tensions and competing interests, it appears to be able to engage them all and benefit from it. Pakistan may not have the capability to act as a matchmaker for the regional heavyweights, but it seems to know how to engage with each of them on their own terms.
Pakistan may currently be in a geopolitical sweet spot, but this might not last long. Considering that it is Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the structural competition with China and Russia that has greatly supported Pakistan’s favourable position, if the US reverts to its rivalry with China, Pakistan could be forced to choose sides. How long Beijing will tolerate Islamabad’s flirtation with Washington remains uncertain, especially given that China’s global ambitions are likely to clash with American interests over time. Similarly, how far will the US be willing to accommodate its rival’s close ally in its regional security arrangements?
Over time, as the US feels the pressure of China’s global rise, Pakistan’s ability to play both sides will decline. Pakistan’s current geopolitical sweet spot is mainly due to the lack of an intense, direct geopolitical competition between the US and China. Conversely, India’s loss of a similar strategic advantage stems from the absence of such a competition.
More importantly, Pakistan may be engaging in too many tactical and strategic games simultaneously, which could become difficult to sustain. As the region’s geopolitics become more vitiated and competition intensifies, these efforts risk backfiring and destabilising the very leverage Pakistan seeks to gain. For India, this means that it could once again be forced to beef up security on its western and northern flanks.
Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor, Shiv Nadar University, founder & director, Council for Strategic and Defence Research, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
