Dowry death convicts also disqualified to inherit property of the victim: HC
Bombay High Court ruled that persons convicted for causing dowry death are disqualified from inheriting property under Hindu Succession Act.
MUMBAI: Placing the broader interpretation of the term “murder” appearing in section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which disqualifies the “murderer” from inheriting the property of the victim, the Bombay high court recently held that even the persons convicted for causing dowry death would also be disqualified to inherit the property of the deceased woman.
The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (HSA) is a law in India that aims to simplify inheritance laws and establish a uniform system for succession. It applies to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs, and relates to the legal distribution of assets of a deceased person who dies without a will, or intestate.
“A person who has caused dowry death of a woman, falls within the dragnet of the disqualification prescribed under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the civil court,” said single judge bench of justice NJ Jamadar in the verdict delivered on Tuesday.
Section 25 of the 1956 act provides that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the victim or any other property in furtherance of the succession.
Justice Jamadar said the disqualification provided under section 25 is based on public policy that a person who causes death of another person whose property he seeks to inherit, cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own felonious act.
{{/usCountry}}Justice Jamadar said the disqualification provided under section 25 is based on public policy that a person who causes death of another person whose property he seeks to inherit, cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own felonious act.
{{/usCountry}}The disqualification, the judge said, is premised on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. “The avowed object to disqualify such a person was to disallow a person to accelerate his inheritance by causing death of the person whose property he seeks to inherit.”
{{/usCountry}}The disqualification, the judge said, is premised on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. “The avowed object to disqualify such a person was to disallow a person to accelerate his inheritance by causing death of the person whose property he seeks to inherit.”
{{/usCountry}}The court was hearing a plea filed by Pawan Jain, a city resident, seeking a succession certificate in respect of certain debts and securities belonging to his married daughter, Sejal Jain, who had died at her matrimonial home.
{{/usCountry}}The court was hearing a plea filed by Pawan Jain, a city resident, seeking a succession certificate in respect of certain debts and securities belonging to his married daughter, Sejal Jain, who had died at her matrimonial home.
{{/usCountry}}Sejal died in February 2014, barely after marrying Anurag Jain who was based in Noida. In July 2019, Anurag, his father Swatantrakumar Jain and mother Kamla Jain were convicted for causing dowry death of Sejal and sentenced and are serving their prison term.
Against this backdrop, Pawan Jain had filed the plea, claiming the closest legal heir of his daughter was disqualified from inheriting her properties in view of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act.
The testamentary department of the high court, however, took objection to the tenability of the plea, stating that the husband of the deceased woman was alive, and he had not been convicted of “murdering” her. The department said the person convicted for dowry death cannot be equated with a “murderer” and therefore the husband of the deceased was not disqualified to inherit her property.
Justice Jamadar overruled the objection. The judge said it is true that the term, “murder” has not been defined in the Hindu Succession Act, but the definition of the term under section 300 of the Indian Penal Code is a technical definition and is meant for imposing punishment and therefore it cannot be readily imported to construe the term, “murder” under section 25.
The judge asserted that it was not correct to interpret the term used in an enactment dealing with inheritance and succession by importing the definition of a similar term used in a penal statute. “Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 do not operate in the same field,” said the court. “Therefore, the term, ‘murder’ ought to receive its ordinary and common parlance connotation,” when it comes to dealing with the disqualification prescribed under the Hindu Succession Act, it added.
The judge said in the context of the disqualification under section 25, there does not appear to be much qualitative difference in the offences punishable under section 302 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, as both the crimes involve the untimely death of the person concerned.
