Chinese checkers with Pakistan and the Taliban

China taking primary ownership to try and mend Afghanistan-Pakistan ties can bog Beijing down in a region and conflict where it has limited experience

As the international affairs spotlight oscillates between the wildings of President Donald Trump’s administration and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, a recent visit by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi to Kabul has gone under the radar for both its relevance and a conundrum that Xi Jinping’s Beijing has found itself in.

Going forward, Beijing may find itself as a sole security guarantor to try and make sure that the Taliban and Pakistan do not disintegrate into chaos. (AP)

The Chinese minister landed in Kabul for the first time since 2022 for the sixth China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue on August 20. This mechanism between the three countries was resumed to largely promote interests of the duopoly of China and Pakistan in Afghanistan following the chaotic US military withdrawal in August 2021 following the closure of a 20-year-long military campaign, which only ended up replacing the old Taliban with a new one. However, for China, along with Russia and Iran, making sure western military presence in the region does not return remains a core security aim. Pakistan, on the other hand, can play spoiler by allowing Washington limited basing despite Beijing and Islamabad having a self-declared all-weather strategic bilateral.

However, cracks between the two sides soon began to play out in public. Issues pertaining to the border at the contested Durand Line flared up. The Pakistanis blamed the Taliban of giving a free hand to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) led by Noor Wali Mehsud, a group that has conducted strikes inside Pakistani territory. Simultaneously, regions surrounding the China-led economic belt known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) such as Gwadar have seen terror attacks against Beijing’s presence. According to numbers quoted in Pakistani media, 20 Chinese citizens have been killed and more than 35 injured in attacks since 2021.

China does have previous experience as a mediator. Beijing hosted the Hamas leadership in July 2024, where the Palestinian militant group signed a “unity deal” with rival faction Fatah. In March 2023, it played host and facilitated a normalisation deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian mediation was a photo op at best, leading to a limited practical outcome. Between Riyadh and Tehran, China was only the right actor, at the right place, at the right time for the likes of Saudi Arabia to send signals to their partners in the US considering the visceral response China often invokes within the American strategic ecosystem.

Pakistan–Afghanistan engagement is, however, a whole different ball game. China taking primary ownership to try and mend ties can bog Beijing down in a region and conflict where it has limited experience. The one trick that China does know in these circumstances is to throw money at the problem, and hope it will resolve many of the issues. Hence it comes as no surprise that during Wang’s visit it was decided Afghanistan will be linked to CPEC. For Islamabad as well, reigning in an isolated Taliban using the carrot of economic development could potentially offer dividends. To do this, Pakistan needs China, considering that its own economy is in a spiral.

From a Chinese perspective, on paper, the above ideas could be turned into an actionable strategy. But the fact remains that China has very poor understanding of cultural, ideological, and theological ethos that anchor this region. Beijing has a contested history of being accommodative to Islam in its restive Xinjiang province where the population lives under heavy State surveillance. On the other side, China has demanded security guarantees from the Taliban on terrorism, more specifically Uyghur militants who have influence in Xinjiang. However, instead of dismantling these groups, the Taliban relocated them away from provinces such as Badakhshan, which shares a narrow 90-kilometre-long border with China. Since 2021, Beijing has pushed for counter-terrorism outposts in the Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of land in the north bordering China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.

Managing Pakistan–Afghanistan can become a security quagmire for Beijing. Not long after Wang left Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban accused the latter of conducting airstrikes inside its territories. In response, the Taliban summoned Pakistan’s ambassador. Islamabad had only upgraded ties to ambassador level in May. The Taliban is also aggressive in regional outreach with interim foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi reportedly slated to visit India soon, a trip that will not add to Pakistan’s creeping mistrust of the Taliban. Going forward, Beijing may find itself as a sole security guarantor to try and make sure that the Taliban and Pakistan do not disintegrate into chaos. This role, interestingly, could become like those previously played by the US, and often chastised by China itself as a form of foreign interference.

Kabir Taneja is deputy director and fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation. The views expressed are personal