How India can bridge trust deficit with China
Practical and unconventional strategies rooted in cultural goodwill diplomacy, rather than formal bureaucratic agreements, may help in building the relationship
Two elements are vital for fostering a sustainable relationship with China. First, it is important to confront the entrenched historical mistrust that traces back to the Gupta period in the 6th century, which created a philosophical divide between Chinese and Indian viewpoints.

Second, promoting genuine collaboration necessitates a more adaptable and pragmatic strategy rooted in cultural goodwill diplomacy, rather than depending on erratic formal bureaucratic agreements, which involve inherent risk, as the Chinese have previously demonstrated their capacity to unilaterally halt agreements. That is why Russia, Central Asian States, and Southeast Asian countries have implemented both practical and unconventional approaches to work with China.
In modern times, the Indian narrative on China has been influenced by a multifaceted and distorted portrayal of China by the West. Consequently, the Indian military and diplomatic sectors have embraced a cautious stance towards China, thereby perpetuating stereotypes of mistrust and deception. Such mutual perceptions have hardened over time, with the Chinese viewing Indians as overly assertive and unreliable, making it challenging to shift these entrenched beliefs.
It is essential to recognise certain traits of China’s statecraft and its approach to negotiations. The Chinese tend to prioritise establishing long-lasting relationships over the pursuit of immediate benefits, highlighting that trust is more significant than the necessity for formal contracts.
It is essential to recognise that China’s complex society cannot be simplified to Communism, as its roots are profoundly embedded in Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, which shape social values and interactions. Consequently, in the context of negotiations, Western entities have come to acknowledge that engaging with China needs more nuanced strategies. Over the last 50 years, Western negotiators have progressively adopted guanxi (a Chinese term that describes an individual’s ability to build relationships for productive purposes) principles to cultivate flexible relationships with China, prioritising collaboration rather than conflict to protect shared interests.
China’s economic and political landscape defies simple labels, revealing a complex consumer society that prioritises wealth generation rather than adhering strictly to Communist ideals. This perspective is underscored by Joann Pittman, an Australian corporate cross-cultural trainer with 28 years of experience in China, who asserts that when engaging with China, it is crucial to embrace complexity rather than rely on simplistic dichotomies, as the reality often exists beyond simple contrasts.
“Saving face” is essential, as the Chinese frequently employ informal intermediaries to facilitate successful negotiations. During the recent border discussions, our perception of the Chinese as “unreliable” was juxtaposed with their characterisation of us as “inflexible”. This highlights the significance of intermediaries, such as Russia/SCO, in navigating these complex discussions.
The Chinese place importance on the process of striving towards a goal rather than merely focusing on achieving the goal itself. They follow the principle of Tao Guang Yang Hui in their diplomatic efforts to highlight the value of strategic patience and the skill of waiting for the most opportune moment to promote their interests.
In his 2022 speech at the 20th National Congress of the CCP, President Xi Jinping highlighted the significance of “cultivating opportunities from crises and transforming crisis into opportunities”. It essentially means biding time for leveraging adversaries’ vulnerabilities. For example, leveraging the Tibetan dilemma, China effectively transforms India’s vulnerabilities into opportunities for its own strategic gain, often unchallenged by New Delhi. The situation involving the Dalai Lama is a prime example of how India has inadvertently played into China’s hands. Similarly, Beijing’s recent commitment to assist India, in light of New Delhi’s concerns regarding Washington, underscores a significant opportunity for China to engage with India without facing pushback.
At the same time, it is essential to recognise that, despite a facade of discretion, China’s strategic engagements often conceal deeper motives, as evidenced by their careful strategies in collaborating with India on issues such as Afghanistan and the climate crisis, which have done little to alleviate mutual suspicion.
The political approach was indeed pursued. However, despite the initial optimism from the 2018 Wuhan Summit, the 2019 Chennai Summit indicated that internal dynamics might have obstructed the advancement of their top-down political dialogue.
India’s endeavours to establish a sustainable cooperative framework for addressing the border dispute with China have often been met with resistance. One reason is that India has consistently emphasised crisis management over finding a solution. This arises from an insufficiently nuanced comprehension of one another’s strategic motivations. Similarly, the initiatives for strengthening trade relations have transitioned into a transactional client-vendor dynamic instead of promoting genuine reciprocity. Although easing investment restrictions on China could alleviate the impact of the 50% US tariff, the future of India’s trade relationship is contingent upon China’s readiness to lower obstacles to Indian exports and improve market access. It is possible that Indian products could see a rise in demand within the markets of China’s western provinces, such as Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Nevertheless, realising this potential would require the development of a certain degree of trust, which cannot be achieved without a change in policy viewpoints.
While Prime Minister Modi seems keen for a breakthrough, his security advisor, with his intelligence background, would be taking a more cautious perspective on the matter. Nonetheless, the efforts of the special representatives and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) institutional framework seem to be having a positive impact in reducing border tensions. However, sustaining optimism is essential to rebuilding trust and normalcy. So far, both sides have avoided delving into sensitive topics, except for a brief clarification regarding India’s stance on Taiwan. A lack of openness about their true intentions and strategic clarity may undermine the fragile stability along the border. Indian Sinologists are now expressing the view that it is appropriate for the two nations to explore their historical metaphysical connections that linked India and China millennia ago, alongside diplomatic efforts designed to alleviate the existing mistrust.
There exists no alternative “big picture” viewpoint other than to focus on the most significant convergence of Buddhism to foster our future relationship. We seem unaware that China is the only country where India’s Sarvastivadin Abhidhamma Buddhist tradition (the doctrine asserting that all is real) continues to be preserved. Regrettably, this deeply rooted and profound connection between India and China is being subverted by an excessive focus on other relatively minor Mahayana/Vajrayana sects.
P Stobdan is a former ambassador and senior fellow at Delhi Policy Group. The views expressed are personal