E-Paper
The path before India as Bangladesh transitions
New Delhi’s approach must balance immediate pressures with longer-term vision and tactical adjustments with strategic consistency
South Asia today presents a study in contrast. While India’s polity and economy have maintained resilience, our immediate neighbourhood faces profound transitions that will shape the regional architecture for decades to come. Bangladesh, our largest land neighbour, stands at such a crossroads. After a student-led uprising ousted the Sheikh Hasina government last year, it is scheduled to hold its first general elections on February 12, 2026. How we navigate this moment will define not merely bilateral relations, but the broader question of what kind of regional and global power India aspires to be.
Over the past 15 years, Bangladesh emerged as one of India’s most successful partnerships in South Asia, a template for what neighbourhood cooperation could achieve. This led to improved border infrastructure and connectivity, and resulted in a 600% increase in bilateral trade from 2009 to 2024. Dhaka’s decisive action against insurgent safe havens in its territory directly contributed to improved security conditions in India’s northeastern states.
What has transpired in Bangladesh since mid-2024 merits careful analysis. The economic indicators are stark. GDP growth, at 6.1% in 2023, has declined to an estimated 3.3-4% in FY25. Inflation, around 5.6% under the previous administration, surged to 10.87% by September 2025. Between July and December 2024, Bangladesh lost an estimated 2.1 million jobs. With approximately 32 million young people either unemployed or outside the education system in a population of 170 million, the World Bank projects that an additional three million Bangladeshis could be pushed into poverty in 2025. Economic distress of this magnitude creates conditions for political volatility and, historically, ideological radicalisation.
In August 2024, the interim government revoked the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. These organisations — restricted from political activity since 2013 on grounds that their charters conflicted with Bangladesh’s secular constitution — now operate without constraints. Such developments, combined with the rising interest of Pakistan and its security agencies in Bangladesh, can have serious consequences on peace and stability in Bengal and our North East.
Concurrently, the Awami League, supported by an estimated 30% of the electorate, has been systematically removed from political participation. One need not endorse every policy of the previous administration to recognise that the effective elimination of Bangladesh’s largest secular-democratic party from the political arena represents a profound reconfiguration of the country’s institutional balance.
The treatment of religious minorities carries particular resonance for India. Between August 4-20, 2024, the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian (Aikio Parishad) Unity Council documented 2,010 incidents of attacks on minority communities across the country. An independent investigation by Prothom Alo identified 1,068 attacks in 49 districts during the same period. While subsequent months saw some decline in “reported” incidents, the pattern continuing, albeit in lower numbers, raises concerns about the security of Bangladesh’s constitutional commitment to minority protection. While current circumstances differ significantly from the refugee crisis of 1971, the potential for even a fraction of such displacement, given Bangladesh’s population, would have serious implications for India’s eastern states.
No analysis would be complete without acknowledging the broader geopolitical context. During the Beijing visit of Muhammad Yunus, the chief advisor to the interim government, in March this year, China committed $2.1 billion in loans, investments, and grants to Bangladesh, building upon its longstanding engagement. Over the past decade, Beijing has emerged as Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and has pledged infrastructure financing that various estimates place between $24-50 billion.
India has consistently maintained that Bangladesh’s external partnerships are matters of its sovereign choice. However, the concentration of strategic assets such as ports, telecom infrastructure, energy facilities under external financing arrangements should engage India’s interest, which lies in maintaining a balanced regional security architecture, particularly in the Bay of Bengal.
It is within this comprehensive context that the question of extradition of Sheikh Hasina, should Bangladesh’s current authorities formally request her return, must be considered. India would naturally examine any such request through appropriate legal and diplomatic channels. The India-Bangladesh Extradition Treaty provides the relevant framework. This is not a matter for unilateral decision-making or political expediency; it is a question of legal process, treaty obligations, and sovereign discretion. That said, extradition treaties universally recognise that States retain discretion, particularly in cases involving political persecution or capital punishment, given the questions of legal standards, humanitarian concerns, diplomatic implications, and crucially, regional stability.
Nations develop reputations not merely through what they do in moments of alignment, but through how they respond when partners face adversity. The manner in which India handles this situation will be observed not only in Dhaka but in capitals across South Asia.
India’s response in this moment, therefore, carries significance beyond the bilateral relationship with Bangladesh. It concerns the kind of predictability and reliability that India projects as a regional partner and the degree to which our partnerships are understood to have durability even when political fortunes shift.
As India considers its approach in the months ahead, several elements might inform a balanced strategy. Its approach must, therefore, rest on a calibrated and principled engagement that is both legally sound and strategically farsighted.
At the same time, New Delhi should continue to encourage conditions that allow Bangladesh to have a credible and inclusive electoral process, recognising that the exclusion of its largest secular party poses serious questions about the legitimacy and the sustainability of post-election stability.
Economic considerations must also remain central, knowing that rising unemployment, inflation, and social pressures create fertile ground for radicalisation and instability that would inevitably spill across borders.
Above all, India’s conduct should aim to signal continuity and principle: Balancing legal obligations with humanitarian concerns, treaty commitments with strategic foresight, and bilateral sensitivities with the broader need to preserve stability across South Asia.
India’s approach to a neighbourhood in transition must balance immediate pressures with longer-term vision, tactical adjustments with strategic consistency, and the recognition that how we treat partners during moments of adversity shapes the partnerships available to us in moments of stability.
Harsh Vardhan Shringla is a Rajya Sabha MP and former foreign secretary. The views expressed are personal
