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The Year That Was: A world less predictable
Several key issues occupying the bandwidth of Indian diplomats were interlinked, including the need to balance the strategic partnership with Russia with growing pressure from the US.
India’s foreign policy firmament faced some of its strongest challenges in recent years in 2025, ranging from a four-day conflict with Pakistan to a rapid downturn in India-US relations over President Donald Trump’s whimsical policies, and upheaval in neighbouring Bangladesh and Nepal with far-reaching impacts on bilateral ties.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first few world leaders to visit Washington in February after the inauguration of Trump’s second term and the two leaders agreed on a roadmap for trade and other strategic sectors, few could have imagined the speed with which a relationship built up over the past two decades would hit an all-time low just months later.
Trump’s repeated claims of having brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan after their brief but intense conflict in May, his administration’s growing proximity to Pakistan Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, and the slapping of 50% tariffs on Indian goods – including a 25% penalty over Russian oil purchases – meant the India–US relationship was hit by a trust deficit reminiscent of the Cold War era.
The two sides held negotiations on what was meant to be the first tranche of a bilateral trade deal — initially to be concluded by the autumn of 2025 — but the asks of the US administration in sensitive sectors for India such as agriculture and dairy left most experts believing that a resolution lay with political leadership rather than negotiators.
Several key issues occupying the bandwidth of Indian diplomats were interlinked, including the need to balance the strategic partnership with Russia with growing pressure from the US over India’s continued purchases of Russian oil and military hardware, as Trump’s frustration grew over the lack of success in ending the Russia–Ukraine conflict. By the end of the year, India cut back on energy purchases from Russia, which had emerged as a top oil supplier over the past three years, and increased the uptake of American energy, but there were no signs of Trump rolling back his punitive levy.
“If the US is serious about partnership, it should first cut the punitive tariff on Indian exports, especially since the Russian oil issue – the stated trigger – has already been resolved,” said Ajay Srivastava, founder of Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI). “New Delhi must insist on balance, not optics, and remain extremely cautious about giving concessions on agriculture crops or GMO products,” he said.
Chris Clary, an associate professor of political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York, said the Trump-Modi falling out directly links to two major foreign policy developments for India, “since the souring of US-India ties is arguably the most enduring result of the India-Pakistan clashes in May and the worsening US-India ties only gave further impetus to India-China rapprochement”.
Former ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, distinguished fellow for foreign policy studies at Gateway House, said Washington’s relations with countries around the world, including India, had been impacted by “Trumpism” and it remained to be seen if the relations can be repaired and restored to their former level.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India toward the end of the year for the annual summit, focused on strengthening the economic partnership through a five-year plan to address the trade imbalance and a pact on mobility for Indian workers, helped signal that New Delhi had other policy options. “It was a corrective measure aimed at creating more diplomatic space, and that made the visit especially important at a time when the downturn in India–US relations is lasting longer than expected,” Bhatia said.
While India and the US continued with cooperation in crucial fields – such as the joint launch of the NISAR satellite by NASA and ISRO, military exercises, and the signing of a 10-year defence framework agreement by the defence ministers – the unravelling of the overall relationship had its impact on multilateral frameworks such as Quad, with no date still in sight for the grouping’s annual summit which is to be hosted by India and which will require a visit by Trump.
In April, the Pahalgam terror attack by The Resistance Front, a proxy of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, triggered another round of tensions with Pakistan that culminated with the four-day conflict in May. India initially struck terrorist infrastructure at nine locations, and this was followed by both sides targeting each other with drones, missiles and long-distance weapons. Though military officials of both sides reached an understanding on ending military actions, the situation remains fragile and another terror attack would have the potential of triggering a further conflict.
The conflict also highlighted the military and strategic support provided by China, with which India is engaged in a protracted effort to normalise relations after a four-year standoff on the Line of Actual Control. India and China resumed the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and direct flights after five years, and New Delhi eased visa norms for Chinese tourists and businesspeople, but both sides still maintain around 50,000 troops each in the Ladakh sector. India also grappled with the fallout of China’s restrictions on exports of heavy machinery, fertilisers and critical minerals.
Within the neighbourhood, India was caught off guard by the Gen Z protest movement in Nepal in September that unseated the government led by KP Sharma Oli, who failed to read growing youth anger over poor governance and corruption allegations. Even more dire was Bangladesh’s descent into chaos toward the end of the year after the assassination of radical student leader Sharif Osman Hadi, a frequent critic of what he called “India’s hegemony”. Protests over Hadi’s death took on anti-India overtones, with mobs attempting to target Indian missions.
“There has been a serious failure of governance and the anarchy in Bangladesh is good for no-one,” said Deb Mukherjee, who served as India’s high commissioner to Dhaka during 1995-2000. “The only hope is for elections as it will be good for Bangladesh to have an elected government.”
Clary said the collapse in India-Bangladesh ties is set to continue into 2026, both because of Dhaka’s “considerable struggles to contain disorder at home and how Hindu-Muslim troubles in Bangladesh interact with the domestic Indian politics that will necessarily flow from the final months of the West Bengal assembly election campaign”.
The unrest created by the nationwide protests in Bangladesh have raised questions about the holding of the general election and a referendum on constitutional changes as scheduled in February. Even if the elections are held and lead to a new government, some experts believe student groups and radical forces, which have gained in strength in recent months, would be able to hobble the administration through their street power.
