Europe has three options for defending Greenland

For now the priority is to deflate Mr Trump’s concerns by demonstrating that his purported worries can be resolved within the existing legal framework.

“IT IS NOT easy to think about solutions when you wake up every morning to new threats.” Such was the understated view of Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Denmark’s foreign minister, on January 14th. He and his Greenlandic counterpart had just held a testy meeting with Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state, and J.D. Vance, the vice-president, in Washington. Since America’s exfiltration of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s dictator, on January 3rd, President Donald Trump has revived his interest in what Mr Rasmussen called “conquering” Greenland. Anything less than having the island “in the hands of the United States” would be “unacceptable”, Mr Trump wrote on social media before the meeting. America needs Greenland “for the purpose of National Security”, he insisted.

Fishermen arrive at the harbour of Nuuk, Greenland, Wednesday, Jan. 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)(AP)

The two sides had “agreed to disagree”, Mr Rasmussen said, offering no hint that his government might compromise on the future of Greenland, a self-governing territory that is part of Denmark. But even if no crisis seems imminent, Mr Trump’s meddling with the sovereignty of a NATO ally has sparked alarm in European capitals. As ever, his intentions are hard to divine. Does America want to divide the Greenlanders from the Danes, to buy the islanders off, or even to invade? Europe’s politicians are scrambling for a strategy. Their options fall into three camps: deflate, deter and distract.

For now the priority is to deflate Mr Trump’s concerns by demonstrating that his purported worries can be resolved within the existing legal framework. Mr Rasmussen said America’s concerns would be considered in a “high-level working group”. Within NATO, Britain and Germany have pushed discussions about an “Arctic Sentry” naval surveillance mission. Some British figures have suggested deployments under the aegis of the Joint Expeditionary Force, a coalition of ten northern European countries. Such proposals are accompanied by the flattery Mr Trump has come to expect from his NATO allies, but also contain stalwart backing for Denmark and Greenland. On January 6th eight European leaders issued a statement asserting the rights of Denmark and Greenland to manage their own affairs.

One difficulty is that Mr Trump’s stated concerns are plainly unserious. Under the terms of an open-ended agreement signed with Denmark in 1951, and updated to include the Greenlanders in 2004, America may in effect station as many troops as it likes on the island. Indeed, the Danes would probably welcome a greater American military presence. After the cold war America shrank what had been a substantial deployment to fewer than 200 troops at a single base on the island’s north-west, now used for space surveillance and early-warning radar. Its annual resupply requires a Canadian ice-breaker. Greenland also sits under NATO’s security umbrella.

Broader security concerns seem overdone, too. “There’s not really a security case for a NATO mission in Greenlandic waters,” says Andreas Osthagen, an Arctic specialist at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo. Evidence is scant for Mr Trump’s claim that the island’s seas are “covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place”. Experts say more pressing Arctic issues are found elsewhere, including America’s own north-western flank around Alaska. As for the rare earths and other minerals which Mr Trump covets, most lie deep beneath Greenland’s ice sheet, and digging them out looks prohibitively expensive. American firms would need no transfer of sovereignty to apply for mining concessions, but few have expressed much interest.

Still, Mr Trump says “ownership is very important”—and it is worth taking him at his word. Securing possession of Greenland is part of the president’s “obsession with legacy”, says a former American diplomat. That means Europe needs to consider its second set of options, which seek to deter a Trump grab for the island. There is some tough talk in Brussels and elsewhere over suspending elements of the European Union’s recently agreed trade deal with America, or imposing a regulatory squeeze on its tech firms. Wilder ideas include shutting American military bases in Europe or dumping Europe’s holdings of US Treasuries.

But assembling majorities for such proposals will be difficult, says Jeremy Shapiro, the Washington-based research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Besides, most amount to retaliation rather than deterrence. Better, he suggests, to consider actions designed to change the decision-making calculus in the White House. These might include establishing a rotational presence of European troops in Greenland; pre-committing to sanctions on American firms that exploit Greenland’s minerals without locals’ consent; and quietly lobbying Republican members of Congress and friendly officials within the administration.

As the meeting in Washington kicked off, Denmark announced an increase in its naval, air and land presence in Greenland, with support from allies including Britain, France, Germany and Sweden. As a symbolic gesture, it looks striking. But do Europeans have the stomach to escalate further? Attitudes vary. Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, is on the hawkish side. On January 14th he told his cabinet that Mr Trump risked triggering “a cascade of unprecedented consequences”. Mette Fredriksen, Denmark’s prime minister, has ramped up her rhetoric, warning that an attack on Greenland would mean the end of NATO. Robert Habeck, a former German vice-chancellor now working at the Danish Institute for International Studies, argues that an American move on Greenland could embolden Russia to nibble at the Nordics. “This is a nightmare, so all measures must be on the table,” he says.

But others fear that an escalation could make a Trump grab more likely, not less. Ukraine is another worry: Europe provides most of the support for its war effort, but antagonising the White House risks sacrificing America’s tentative offer to join Europe in providing Ukraine with security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire. For now, most European politicians seem reluctant to turn the screws. “The problems we have can be solved with Greenland as part of Denmark under the existing treaties,” says Jurgen Hardt, foreign-policy spokesman for Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats. “I’m sure that this argument will convince President Trump.”

The final hope is that Mr Trump may be distracted from his quest. A different leader might have backed a stealthy takeover operation—say, agitating for Greenlandic independence as a prelude to an American association agreement or annexation. But that would require organisation and follow-through, which are not regarded as the president’s strengths. A military takeover would be simpler to execute. But it would test the loyalties of some in the armed forces, the government and especially Congress. (A clutch of bills designed to forestall an annexation have been announced, though they will struggle to win majority votes.) Just 4% of American voters back the use of force to obtain Greenland. Mr Trump has a lot on his plate, from November’s midterms to troubles in Iran, and values easy wins. Perhaps once the sugar high from the Venezuela operation has worn off, he will find something else to worry about. His tough talk may be a mere negotiating gambit to press the Danes into a deal on security or mining. That, at least, is the European hope.